Apart from security reason, study on quantum cryptography [1, 2] is always important. One of such study is the comparative study on EPR and non EPR cryptosystem. This is essentially a study on entanglement vs unentanglement in a particular situation.
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [3] comparatively studied conventional EPR and non EPR cryptosystems. They concluded that these two cryptosystems are same in a sense which type is being used can not be distinguished by others. It follows if sender uses EPR protocol and dishonestly tells it non EPR then receiver also can not verify it. In that sense two cryptosystems are indistinguishable. It is recently understood conventional quantum bit commitment protocol completely fails [4, 5] because of this indistinguishability of two system. Therefore Bennett et al's work becomes helpful to examine other cryptographic task. Their work was based on conventional cryptography. Recently alternative non EPR and EPR protocols have been proposed [6, 7] . Many conclusions drawn from conventional quantum cryptography do not hold good in alternative quantum cryptography. So a fresh comparative study is necessary.
It is revealed that our unentangled based crytosystem uses mixed quantum state to encode a bit value but our entangled based system uses many pure entangled state for the same. Two systems can be distinguished by the receiver. Despite these dissimilarities, they have many similarities. Both can operate on entirely any type of quantum channel. Both provide quantum authentication. In both the system key can carry meaningful information. Eavesdropper's problem is similar for both systems. Bit commitment encoding is possible [8] for both systems. A single bit can be made secure without producing other bits in the two systems.
Still the two systems are not well understood. We have seen that classical channel can not be used in non EPR system when bit by bit security is sought. This means cryptosystem becomes complete quantum cryptosystem in this security criteria. But we do not know whether same is true for EPR system. We also do not know whether conventional cryptography or its prototype can be recovered from these alternative systems or not. Here we shall see that on these two questions two cryptosystems differ.
Consider a source emits pairs of spin 1/2 particle in their singlet state. One particle of each pair is flying towards Alice and its alter ego towards Bob. Let us assume that each n pairs reveal one bit of information. Alice and Bon secretly share the information of two sequences of measurements. Suppose two sequences of direction of spin-measurements are: S n 0 = {P x P x P y P y P x P y P y P y P x P x P y P x ......} and S n 1 = {P y P x P x P x P y P y P x P y P y P y P x P x ......}, where 0 and 1 in the subscripts stand for bit values and P x and P y are two orthogonal directions of measurements.
Suppose they jointly decide bit values. The bit values can be decided when both of them use the same sequence of measurements. To produce a key both use S 0 and S 1 at random on their own sequences of EPR particles. When both use S 0 or S 1 , the corresponding results will be perfectly correlated. But if one use S 0 and other S 1 or vice versa, the results will not be perfectly correlated. So 50% bit value choices are discarded (the discarded bits can be used if they do not want to jointly decide the bit values). The remaining 50% bits form the key. They reveal results through classical public channel to form the key.
In making a key Alice's measurements yield a sequence of unrejected data sets: their data sets contain perfectly correlated data. All the correlated data sets are unrejected and contain random numbers. Therefore in the public channel Eve will get many strings of random numbers. This will not be anyway helpful.
Eavesdropper's problem is to know the secret code of measurements. For simplicity, let us think they want to produce a single bit. For simplicity let us think, only Bob's particles are exposed to Eve. She can directly or indirectly measures using her own sequence of measurements. She gets a set of data from her measurements and taps Alice's set of data when Alice reveals the results. But these two sets of data will neither reveal any bit information nor complete information of Alice's choice of measurements. Now it's Eve's turn to reveal the results. The results can not be perfectly correlated. But this can be interpreted by Alice as a case of non-identical choice of bit values. Note that in S 0 and S 1 there is a common subsequence S c . So if Alice does not get perfect correlation, she can check the data corresponding to S c . Irrespective of choice of sequences of measurements, two sets of data corresponding to S c will be always perfectly correlated. This second test exposes eavesdropping. Still it is not the last nail to eavesdropping.
The data are not secure because public channel is not authenticated channel. Eve can impersonate. After Alice's disclosure of data, Eve impersonating as Bob can reveal "fake data" correlating with Alice's data. Same thing she can do with Bob's data impersonating as Alice. Note that this attack works only for "fake correlation". But in their 50% bit value choices, the data are not perfectly correlated. Only their reduced data sets corresponding to S c are perfectly correlated. So initially if they do not get perfect correlation between their data sets, they will get perfect correlation in the reduced subsets. As S c is hidden in S 0 and S 1 , Eve could not generate "fake less correlated" data with perfectly "fake correlated" sub set of data. This task she can leave for the legitimate users. It seems that system fails.
There is a rescue. Note that "fake correlation" attack works as both of them reveal all the data of the same events. The "fake correlation" can not be produced if they don not reveal any data. But the data has to be revealed if the system is to run. If they do not reveal all the results of the same events, yet the system can work but "fake correlation" attack will not work. For clarity, suppose they divide the results of each set into two sets. Alice's subsets are R . As EPR data sets are not revealed so "fake correlation" attack can not work.
To create many bits (at least n+1 bits because they have shared n bits), the above produce has to be repeated. This ensures bit by bit security. If any bit is found corrupted the next bit will not be produced. They reject S 0 and S 1 and may try with another two shared sequences.
Is it possible to recover existing quantum cryptography from alternative quantum cryptography and vice versa ? To answer this query, the basic difference of the two systems should be understood. In conventional cryptography, a single pure state or single pure entangled state represent a single classical bit (0 or 1) or two classical bits (01 or 10). On the other hand in alternative quantum cryptography, many states represent a single classical bit. The key of the conventional cryptosystem does not carry meaningful information but it does carry meaningful information in alternative cryptosystem. Therefore recovery of alternative system from conventional system is not possible. But if we can produce pure state bits which does not carry any meaningful information from alternative system then at least recovery of prototype of conventional system, if not the same system, will be possible.
We have two options -recovery of conventional EPR system from alternative EPR system and conventional non EPR system from alternative non EPR system. The former can be easily realized in alternative EPR system. We have seen that when both of them use S 0 or S 1 , the data are perfectly correlated. These two set of data can make a key provided they are not revealed. Suppose Alice divides the results into three sets R To construct R 3 , it is better to use the data corresponding to S c so that they always get perfectly correlated data even when they use non-identical sequences of operators. Continuing the process two different kind of keys can be produced -the key does not exist even in the mind of users and other key always exist in the mind of users. If they want to produce only the former type they can share only a single sequence instead of two. On same operation system can run. This will be a sister protocol of conventional EPR cryptosystem. From operational view point they are different otherwise they are same.
The recovery of conventional non EPR system from alternative system is not possible. A sequence of single photon polarized state produces sequence of results. These results can represent bit value. But if these results are revealed they can not be secure.
Why do these two systems respond differently on these two is-sues ? The simple reason is that many EPR sequences generate many, two-correlated strings of random numbers but many identical sequences of operations on many identical sequences of single photon polarized states yield many strings of pseudo random numbers. Many sequences of single photon can yield many strings of random numbers provided the input sequences are all random sequences or sequences of operations become always random. But in our approach, neither we could use always random sequences of single photon nor we could share many sequences of random operations. That's why classical channel can not be used to reveal the results of different data sets those are pseudo-random numbers. EPR cryptosystem is always good secure random number generator.
Throughout our discussion we have struck to bit by bit security. If we do not want bit by bit security but want security of many bits (meaningful) at a time, then such security needs to be proved. In that scenario there may have a possibility of using authenticated classical channel in non EPR type system. In that eventuality we can say continuous use of classical channel and bit by bit security are mutually exclusive in non EPR system.
In the comparative study, noise was not considered. Recently we have presented noise [9] based unconditionally secure quantum and classical cryptosystems. Therefore our alternative quantum systems need not to be protected by bit by bit security. Some of the differences discussed above will vanish in the modified EPR and non-EPR noise based protocols. Even the differences between the noise based quantum and classical cryptosystem belonging to our alternative model, will sometime be blurred.
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